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Neoclassical realist perspectives on the European Defense 
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Introduction 
 
The expression “European Defense Community” (EDC) refers to one of the most 
crucial initiatives of early European integration. The EDC aimed at forming an 
integrated European army, and it was based on an establishing Treaty signed by the six 
Member States of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) on 27 May 1952. 
Despite the initial progress, the project never came to fruition. The causes for this 
failure are several and most of them have been recounted by historians and international 
relations scholars alike. The main consequences of the EDC’s collapse have been a 
major setback in the process of political integration in Western Europe, as well as the 
“lost opportunity” for early European military integration. 
Recognizing the importance of the Pleven Plan and the resulting EDC Treaty as a 
watershed in the history of European integration, this thesis tries to inquire into the 
main causes that brought to the abandonment of the EDC in August 1954 by answering 
the following research question: 
 
“How important were international incentives, domestic factors and deputies’ 
perceptions in influencing the August 1954 vote on the EDC Treaty in the French 
National Assembly?” 
 
In posing this research question, this thesis makes two fundamental choices 
setting it aside from previous research on the subject: First, it considers the failure of 
the EDC from an original standpoint. Namely, it foregoes an analysis of 
intergovernmental negotiations, already carried out by others (Fleischer, 2013), to focus 
on a single event:  the vote of the French National Assembly on the 30th of August 1954 
on the ratification of the EDC Treaty. This thesis considers it the de facto and de jure 
reason why the EDC failed. In this respect, the focus of historians and IR scholars alike 
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(Fursdon, 1980; Ruane, 2000) has always been drawn towards the negotiating and 
“intergovernmental” aspects of the history of the EDC. In comparison, little attention 
has been given to the “moment of truth” constituted by the August 1954 vote, held after 
three days of discussions.  
While the viewpoint taken by previous research is sound, the position of this 
thesis needs explanation: international agreements such as the EDC Treaty result from 
extensive negotiations. In general terms, treaty-making does not have to follow fixed 
prescriptions but is rather carried out by states following their preferences (Cassese, 
2005). In the specific case of the EDC, the so-called “solemn form” later outlined in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has been followed. This procedure, 
representing the standard international law-making process, implies a series of steps: 
negotiations, agreement upon and adoption of a written text, signature, and then 
ratification, in this order (Art. 14, Vienna Convention, 1969). As regards ratification, it 
refers to the formal confirmation on the part of national parliaments of the content of an 
international agreement. It is important to stress that the ratification of an international 
agreement is the act by which a state becomes legally bound by the obligations deriving 
by said agreement and that having signed a treaty does not imply any legal obligation 
until the treaty is ratified. In other words, national institutions such as parliaments can 
be said to have a “last word” on the entering into force of a treaty. 
Given familiarity with the history of the EDC, this is particularly significative. In 
fact, the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community was negotiated, signed 
on 27 May 1952 and then presented to the respective national authorities of the 
Member States for ratification. Whereas ratification was successful for four of the six 
signatories, it failed in France. According to Art. 31 of the French Constitution in force 
at the time, the President of the Republic has the task of ratifying international Treaties 
(Art 31, 1946 Constitution). Nonetheless, it is the lower chamber of the French 
Parliament, the National Assembly, which must first give authorization for ratification 
through a vote. That is, despite the effort, strategy, and all possible intervening factors 
characterizing the negotiating process for the EDC, a parliamentary vote is necessary to 
settle the question. In the case of such a vote, what matters are the role and the 
intentions of the members of the relevant voting assembly, who are independent from 
the opinions and priorities held by their government. In fact, on 30 August 1954, the 
French National Assembly gave reason to the parties opposed to the creation of an 
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integrated European Army, that is the Gaullist Rassemblement du peuple français 
(RPF) and the Communist party.  
Second, this thesis uses the EDC case-study to verify the assumptions of a 
specific IR school of thought, namely neoclassical realism. While preserving the 
interplay of external and internal factors as the main elements shaping foreign policy 
outcomes, neoclassical realism adds a third element to the picture: leaders’ perceptions.  
Concretely, these leaders are the French deputies of 1954, given that they had the last 
word on the EDC Treaty. To test whether assumptions on the weight of their ideas and 
perceptions on foreign policy choices are correct, one must study their words and 
opinions. In other terms, the central assumptions of neoclassical realism motivate the 
focus of this thesis on policy-makers’ perceptions in addition to the classic 
“international incentives-domestic variables” dichotomy.  
The focus of this thesis on a single event might appear narrowminded. From an 
IR standpoint, it might be argued that the voting outcome depended on a series of 
variables acting outside the parliamentary sessions. However, an analysis of such 
variables is near impossible given its scope and usually results in confusion and 
insoluble problems (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell, 2016). Instead, this thesis cuts the 
“Gordian knot” of IR theoretical quagmires going to the substance of the object of 
study and examining the official sources for the reasons put forward by the members of 
the Assembly in their deliberation on the EDC. I argue that the focus of this thesis is 
realistic and intended to give an accurate depiction of the “micro-event” that ultimately 
decided the fate of the EDC. Despite being narrow, it grants clarity and focus to the 
analysis, in addition to taking an original stance on the relative importance of the vote 
in comparison to the negotiating process. 
To summarize, this thesis proposes an original approach for two reasons: first, it 
looks at the EDC’s failure from a point of view which has been deemed secondary by 
previous historical research. Second, it uses its findings on the August 1954 vote on the 
EDC to test the assumptions of an IR school of thought on the determinants of foreign 
policy choices. In doing so, it takes the very broad premises of such IR school and it 
tries to sculpt them into clear and concrete objects that can be subjected to factual 
analysis. This way, “states” become “France”, then the “National Assembly” and then 
the “deputies” opposed to the EDC; and “outcomes” become the “refusal to ratify the 
Treaty” and then the “vote on a preliminary motion” (Wohlforth, 1993). In this way, the 
overarching assumptions of neoclassical realism can be tested.  
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Literature Review 
 
The History of the EDC 
 
Throughout the years and despite progress in research, secondary literature on the 
EDC has been characterized by a persistent attitude. Namely, most of the sources on the 
failure of the EDC share an imbalance in terms of focus towards the negotiating phase 
of the history of the EDC. The protagonists of the executive, namely members of 
government and diplomats, are put center-stage to the detriment of other categories of 
policy-makers and state leaders. Instead, this thesis argues that attention should be 
brought to the pivotal moment of the parliamentary vote for the ratification of the EDC 
Treaty. Many may wonder why research should take such a narrow approach. The 
reason lies in the importance given to domestic dynamics by theories of foreign policy 
and international relations alike. If the claim that «one must analyze how systemic 
pressures are translated through unit level intervening variables such as decision-
makers' perceptions and domestic state structure» (Rose, 1998, p. 152) is to be taken 
seriously, then the focus of this thesis is simply coherent with such theoretical 
premises.  
A parliamentary vote on the ratification of an international agreement that might 
have been extremely consequential for European powers such as France is the 
concretization of the above concept. In most Western democracies, the signed outcome 
of international negotiations must go through the approval of a domestic, 
democratically elected assembly. Throwing the spotlight on the vote, moreover, has the 
advantage of showing the motivations and opinions of a category of “policymakers” 
and “leaders”. Indeed, the other fundamental claim made by IR theories such as 
neoclassical realism is that the perceptions and ideas of policymakers have an important 
role in determining the outcome of state behavior/foreign policy. If this true, then the 
information that can be drawn from the transcripts of parliamentary sessions on EDC 
ratification should be given greater importance in the literature. Previous research has 
certainly taken the ideas, character and “psychology” of state leaders into consideration 
(Fursdon, 1980). However, very few sources have looked in depth into that other 
category of national leaders represented by members of parliament. This meant 
ignoring the fact that their role in determining foreign policy is, from a functional point 
of view, as important as that of diplomats and negotiators, for the simple fact that they 
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can potentially frustrate the efforts made by the first category of state leaders with a 
single vote. With this fundamental remark in mind, this review sets out the main 
secondary sources used by this thesis in chronological order. 
Contemporary perspectives underline the revolutionary importance of the 
initiative, comparing it to the First Crusade (Walton, 1953, p. 42) in terms of historical 
importance and for the number of European state actors involved. Walton’s article is 
particularly valuable as regards the steps that brought to the signing of the Treaty. Yet, 
for chronological reasons, it is ultimately of little importance when it comes to 
determining the most important factors that brought to the failure of the initiative. 
One of the earliest accounts of the French reaction to the EDC comes from Lüthy 
(1954), whose account is intertwined with sociological motives to explain why 
opposition to the EDC had formed in France. This standpoint is particularly useful 
since it allows the researcher to gain an overall description of the political panorama in 
France, not only as regards popular fears and hopes, but also more specific trends 
within the main political parties and, consequently, an overall sketch of the ideas of 
French political leaders. 
In a similar way to this thesis, the only approach focused on the vote in the 
French National Assembly in 1954 is adopted by Kanter (1970). The author takes for 
granted that the outcome of the vote was determined by «ideological commitments» 
and «individual ambition» (Kanter, 1970, p. 203) on the part of the deputies, following 
the reasoning expressed in another source by Leites and Brodan (1959). However, it is 
not certain on what basis these conclusions were reached. Furthermore, Kanter’s article 
does not state clearly its objective and its research agenda is made almost 
incomprehensible by relying on a highly technical statistical study of voting behavior in 
the French Assembly for the EDC vote and in other occasions. His conclusions that 
«consistent commitment to public positions taken on the issues involved» (Kanter, 
1970, p. 227) were at the basis of the EDC’s failure in the vote are realistic, but also 
rather commonplace. Differently from his article, this thesis aims at singling out exactly 
what those issues were and in determining what relationship they entertained with each 
other. Moreover, differently from the quantitative approach taken by Kanter’s article, 
this thesis aims at providing a qualitative approach. 
Fursdon (1980) has provided perhaps one of the most complete accounts of the 
history of the EDC. In his narration of the last steps before the failure of the Treaty, he 
stresses the importance of postponement as «the canker which was threatening to 
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destroy the EDC» (Fursdon, 1980, p. 228), given that progress in the ratification 
process had by then become «entangled with so many other important developing 
events» (Fursdon, 1980, p. 228). In a similar way to other sources, however, the book 
focuses its attention to one of the protagonists of the end of the EDC in France, namely 
Pierre Mendès-France, President of the Council of Ministers until 1955. Fursdon’s 
interest for this figure testifies for the characteristic that many secondary sources on the 
EDC share: important individuals and political figures who are part of the executive are 
usually put center stage by researchers, shifting the focus away from the parliamentary 
aspect of ratification. This attitude, although justifiable, constitutes a limit both for 
historical research on the EDC Treaty and for theorists of international relations. 
An original approach is taken by Aimaq (1996), who links the development of the 
EDC negotiations with the then ongoing conflict in the French colony of Indochina. It 
is the opinion of the author that the EDC was never taken seriously by the French 
government, and that it was instead a ‘bargaining chip’ used to ensure U.S. support in 
defending the integrity of the French colonial empire against the rebel Viet Minh. This 
source is particularly important since, if the view of the author is correct, there is a 
supplementary international/systemic element to be considered. Traditionally, the 
development and the termination of the EDC project is associated with changes in 
Cold-War equilibria, due to events such as the Korean War and the death of Stalin in 
1953. In this case, however, another factor is singled out, pertaining to the French 
colonial empire more than to Cold-War tensions in themselves.  
Starting from another perspective, Ruane (2000) takes a radical position in that he 
focuses most of all on the part played by Anglo-American relations in the history of the 
EDC. Ruane’s book is a remarkable source since it manages to balance a fundamental 
defect with important insights that do benefit the research conducted by this thesis. 
However, it almost exclusively focuses on U.S.-UK relations, drawing upon a wealth of 
archival sources as regards the two Anglo-Saxon powers, but mostly leaving aside 
documentation on “continental” actors. The book explores interpersonal relationships, 
personal history and behavior of leaders such as British Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden. In this sense, the approach of the book is in line with the expectations of a 
neoclassical realist researcher. That is, the accent is put on the behavior of individual 
leaders as well as the wider international dimension of EDC negotiations. The problem 
nevertheless lies in the scope of the work. Despite its accuracy, the book fails to 
provide a complete portrait of the situation as regards the main state actors involved 
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and to account for the influence of their relative domestic variables. After all, the EDC 
Treaty was a French proposal and it did not involve the U.S. nor the UK as signatories. 
Their role was certainly important in an indirect way, and the book allows for 
reflections on the complexity and interconnection of the international system, but the 
utility of this source for this thesis is limited because of its perspective. In contrast, this 
thesis takes both a more France-centric approach and one more focused on internal 
parliamentary dynamics. 
Dwan’s (2001) contribution represents an interesting account of Monnet’s 
approach to the question of the EDC. The article shows how, despite being considered 
its inspirer, Monnet’s enthusiasm for the EDC was in fact nearly absent and he gave 
importance to the project «only to the extent that it was a necessary constituent of a 
political Europe» (Dwan, 2001, p. 155). According to the author, Monnet was certainly 
a protagonist. Nevertheless, his not taking active part in the EDC negotiations nor in the 
1954 vote makes a study of his persona, perceptions and intentions less important for 
the purpose of this thesis. All in all, sources such as his article are valuable, but they 
fail to capture the actual «perceptions of relative power» (Rose, 1989, p. 147) of those 
actively participating in the decision-taking, underscored by neoclassical realists.  
A more recent article by Ruane (2002) is a very useful example of how historical 
research can focus on individual leaders’ preferences and perceptions. The author 
underlines how the attitude of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was pivotal in 
shaping the stance of the United Kingdom with respect to the EDC. Furthermore, the 
article mentions how the perspective of the British Foreign Ministry was important in 
assessing the threat of the US to withdraw its forces to the periphery of the continent in 
case the EDC should fail in 1953 (Ruane, 2002). Although this was not the objective of 
the author, a similar analysis provides inspiration for researchers seeking to verify how 
leaders’ perceptions impact foreign policy action, creating a base for assessing 
neoclassical realist claims. The article nonetheless suffers from the same “defect” of the 
other sources, namely the neglect of the domestic aspects of the ratification process and 
the weight of the parliamentary vote in ultimately deciding the fate of the EDC.  
An article by Creswell (2002) adopts an original and challenging thesis. The main 
argument of the author is that, for cost-efficiency reasons, and to allow its European 
allies to autonomously develop their defenses against the Soviet Bloc, the US intended 
to withdraw troops from continental Europe (Creswell, 2002). The author further argues 
that the U.S. did not use the EDC to force German rearmament on France. All of these 
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are very crucial aspects. However, the article shows the primary focus on international 
incentives that is typical of other pieces of research on the EDC. Although mentioning 
the parliamentary vote of August 1954, the attention of the author remains on the role 
played by the United States and its diplomatic maneuvering with respect to France. 
Creswell and Trachtenberg (2003) make the point that France’s role in Cold War 
Europe was more important than what previous historians usually believed. This idea is 
now taken for granted by this thesis also thanks to their contribution. Moreover, their 
innovative perspective is also one of the reasons why this thesis chooses to go one step 
further and look not just at France as an important actor, but also at the internal, 
domestic “legal” dynamics that ultimately brought to the refusal of the EDC Treaty in 
that country. The authors sanction the EDC as an initiative aimed at counterbalancing 
the will of the U.S. to integrate West Germany in a cohesive Western Bloc. The EDC’s 
failure is justified by classical reflections on fear of lost independence and 
supranationalism in the face of U.S. willingness to rearm the Federal Republic. Despite 
these observations being correct in principle, the article remains heavily centered on the 
role of the U.S. and does not directly address the reasons for the failure or the role of 
domestic, parliamentary actors in it, also downplaying the role of fears of German 
rearmament with respect to “realist” rational considerations. 
A more recent contribution (Pastor-Castro, 2006), poses again the accent on the 
positions and behavior of political protagonists, more specifically the French Foreign 
Ministry, the Quai d’Orsay. According to the article, the Quay d’Orsay had an 
important role during the negotiations but, except for Foreign Minister Mendès-France, 
it could not effectively intervene in the context of the parliamentary vote that brought to 
the failed ratification of the EDC Treaty. All in all, the approach taken by the article is 
congenial to the neoclassical realist research puzzle. That is, it focuses on the political 
elite of a country, describing its possible agenda, preferences and perceptions in a way 
that fits perfectly the needs of neoclassical realism. Other than that, the point of view of 
the article is in line with the one adopted by previous research. By confirming that the 
Foreign Ministry could not avoid the failure of the EDC, Pastor-Castro’s article 
strengthens the validity of this thesis’ intuition that importance should be given (also) 
to the Assembly to explain the EDC’s failure. 
More recent articles, such as Konde (2013) and Flescher (2013) go back over the 
different phases of the negotiation of the EDC Treaty, including its final failure. 
Whereas Konde (2013) stresses Mendès-France’s importance for the negotiations and 
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the vote, broadly giving an overview of the EDC’s history from a “governmental” 
perspective, Fleischer (2013) is more analytical. His article implements process tracing 
to demonstrate the importance of factors such as ‘uncertainty’ in determining the 
outcome of the negotiations. Like other IR approaches, the article has two main flaws: 
first, it tries to give a scientific explanation of a phenomenon that is the sum of a 
myriad of different smaller events. The difficulty of making all these events fit within a 
simple theory with determinants and a fixed outcome makes so that the resulting theory 
can only be taken with skepticism. In other words, the article has the ambition of 
explaining the «mechanism» (Fleischer, 2013, p. 72) through which the EDC failed, 
despite the complexity of the situation and the innumerable forces at play. Second, 
states are essentially treated as monolithic entities, even when referring to the different 
Foreign Ministries. It is very useful that this article refers to the concept of ‘uncertainty’ 
to explain state behavior, but it should be specified that states in themselves cannot be 
‘uncertain’ and that there must be human actors that are unsure about the information 
they possess. However, to the article’s defense, demonstrating the individual 
uncertainty of diplomats is a task that goes beyond the scope of IR theory and that is 
almost impossible to carry out in retrospective. 
Overall, previous literature has left aside the decisive ratification vote in France 
and has mostly neglected French deputies as domestic policymakers and their ideas. 
This is where neoclassical realism comes into the picture. 
 
Neoclassical Realism 
 
In general terms, neoclassical realism posits that Außenpolitik factors, meaning 
forces swaying state behavior belonging to the international system (Rose, 1998), are 
“filtered” through Innenpolitik factors, that is to say “domestic” elements influencing 
foreign policy. Moreover, neoclassical realists argue that the incentives of Außenpolitik 
must also be understood and interpreted by «flesh and blood officials» (Rose, 1998, p. 
158). This presupposition creates an interesting challenge for researchers who want to 
test the validity of neoclassical realist claims. While extensive historical research has 
been conducted on the influence of systemic and domestic factors on state behavior, the 
role of individual perceptions remains relatively undertheorized.  
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Overall, it is possible to explain the origin and development of neoclassical 
realism as if it were an evolutionary process. Historically, the classical IR realist trend 
originated in the 1940s with authors such as Morgenthau (1948). Despite its importance 
and influence on successive trends, classical realism was not free from imperfections. 
To address these theoretical problems, a new trend, called “neorealism” emerged during 
the Cold War, the main exponents of which is Waltz (1979).  
In general terms, neorealism (also called “structural realism”) posits that state 
behavior is influenced preeminently by the “structure” of the international system 
(Waltz, 1979). According to neorealists, the international system has an “anarchic” 
structure. That is, it does not include any form of higher authority that dictates the 
behavior of states or impose any rule that states must submit to. Therefore, states exist 
in a persistent condition of peril, given that there is virtually nothing halting other states 
from commencing an aggression. In a certain sense, this is very similar to the bellum 
omnium contra omnes described by Thomas Hobbes. With the fundamental difference 
that whereas Hobbes’ political theory posits that a higher authority must necessarily 
emerge, this has not been the case for the international system, which remains, also in 
the words of international legal scholars, a «primitive» one (Cassese, 2005, p. 6). 
The theoretical apparatus on which neorealism rests is strong and fascinating. 
Nevertheless, some of its assumptions have been increasingly challenged since the end 
of the Cold War, given the emergence and persistence of an international order that is 
apparently not based on power and fear, but rather on rules, principles and 
interconnection. With its premises confronted from multiple angles, neorealism has 
progressively given way to a plethora of alternative theories that try to explain the 
cooperative and relatively peaceful state of the international system, such as 
neoliberalism (Keohane, 1984), liberal institutionalism (Moravcsik, 1997) and social 
constructivism (Wendt, 2000).  
The inability of neorealism to explain recent changes in world politics highlighted 
the need for a further “evolutionary step” of the realist tradition, which brought to the 
formation of a “neoclassical realist” school. The trend, taking shape in the 1990s thanks 
to the seminal works of Wohlforth (1993), Christensen (1996), Schweller (1998), 
Zakaria (1998) and Rose (1998), aimed at correcting some of the mistakes of 
neorealism. Starting from the premise that the independent variable dictating states’ 
foreign policy are international incentives defined as relative material power, rather 
than structure (Rose, 1998), neoclassical realism introduces two major elements to its 
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depiction of the international system: first, the domestic, unit-level differences among 
states; second, the perceptions of state leaders. In other terms, neoclassical realism 
posits that relative power, namely «the capabilities or resources [...] with which states 
can influence each other» (Wohlforth, 1993, p.4) should take center stage in place of 
the anarchic structure of the international system. In addition to this, neoclassical realist 
authors take two new intervening variables into consideration when trying to explain 
state behavior. That is, they argue that the incentives provided by the international 
system are interpreted by states at the unit level through their domestic characteristics 
(their decision-making processes) and through the subjective perceptions of statesmen. 
The premises of neoclassical realism are sound on paper. They put this trend of 
IR thinking in a sort of middle ground between purely systemic views of foreign policy 
(like structural realism) and more malleable perspectives (like social constructivism). 
That is, neoclassical realism combines material and deterministic elements such as the 
incentives given by the surroundings of a state with psychological and cognitive 
elements (Rose, 1998). Given the scope of neoclassical realism, it is no wonder that this 
approach has been targeted with criticism. 
Traditionally, critiques on neoclassical realism revolve around the fact that it is 
difficult to draw the line between its predecessor, neorealism, and this new iteration of 
realism (Freyberg-Inan, Harrison, 2009; Ross Smith, 2018). Another important type of 
critique comes from the similar and yet opposite trend of social constructivism, as 
highlighted by Foulon (2015). The constructivist critique revolves around the 
importance given by neoclassical realism to material structure as opposed to ideas and 
perceptions. Nonetheless, leaders’ subjectivities play a role in interpreting material 
incentives for neoclassical realists, together with the internal organization of states. It is 
therefore a disappointment that more recent critiques (Narizny, 2017; 2018) seem to 
ignore the cognitive aspect of neorealism altogether. Given the importance of this 
feature for the neoclassical realist framework as a whole, this thesis takes it as an 
inalienable part of the theory and tests it together with the other two.  
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Research Design 
 
Methodology 
 
This thesis utilizes a qualitative method to draw conclusions from the sources 
utilized. More specifically, this thesis analyzes the discourse contained in the transcripts 
of the relevant August 1954 Sessions of the French National Assembly. The sessions 
having the EDC Treaty as a topic are six in total, divided among three days, with two 
sessions taking place on August 28th, three on August 29th and one on August 30th. 
They are studied to evaluate the weight and importance of the factors involved in the 
decision-making process of the French Assembly in reaching its conclusion not to 
allow for the ratification of the EDC Treaty. Among the most important ones are: 
 
1) International incentives (relative material power capabilities); 
2) Domestic unit-level variables; 
3) Leaders’ perceptions. 
 
More than their relative importance, this thesis looks at the interaction among 
them to see whether the fundamental relationship among the three variables outlined by 
neoclassical neorealist theory can be demonstrated in the case-study of the EDC. Such 
relationship can be exemplified as follows: 
 
 
Thus, attention is given to the speeches of deputies, their role, political group and 
history. Their words and thoughts are taken as hints of their ideas and perceptions and 
• International 
Incentives
Are "filtered" 
by
• Domestic 
Variables
And
• Leaders' 
Perceptions
Leading to
• Foreign 
Policy 
Decisions
Outcomes
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are used to infer how the international situation interacts with their views on the 
material capabilities of France and its partners. As regards domestic variables, it can be 
said that the entire case study (an analysis of the sessions of August 1954) exemplifies 
what is meant by filtering international events through unit-level variables or the 
internal, political and legal structure of states.  
In referring to the text of each of the sessions, this thesis will use the following 
format: Date of the session (day), number of the session in roman numbers and, if 
referring to a specific point or sentence, the page including that sentence. For instance, 
if referring to the preamble of the first session of the 28th of August, the reference is: 
(28, I, p. 2). Given that the transcripts are in the original French version, literal 
quotations are made only if necessary, if a translation does not need to be provided or if 
the expression is particularly significative. The discussion is organized as follows: a 
summary of the most important elements emerging from each of the days of sessions 
will be provided. Afterwards, a paragraph lays out the main thoughts and observations 
relating the content of the sources with the research question and the literature. 
More than once, speakers make specific references to documents and events to 
prove their points. Especially when interpreting legal sources, it is not possible for this 
thesis to point out whether they are right or wrong. Rather, the focus should be on the 
nature of their arguments instead of their validity, even though evident contradictions 
are present in the discourse of some deputies.  
The merits and demerits of this approach both stem from the same source. 
Namely, the fact that it tries to provide an original contribution dealing with a well-
established research topic. On the one hand, it is a rather narrow approach, focusing on 
the political/bureaucratic process leading to a final decision in French foreign policy. 
On the other hand, it sheds light on an aspect that has been often overlooked. Despite 
its limited scope, the approach taken by this thesis strives to be as coherent as possible 
and it takes seriously the assumptions of theories such as neoclassical realism. After all, 
the vote of the French National Assembly under scrutiny is the factual reason why the 
EDC failed. If one wants to inquire into the reasons why the Treaty was not ratified, he 
must first and foremost look for answers in that specific event, moving away from the 
observation of wider and rather ineffable macro-events and focusing on specific, fact-
based and officially recorded occurrences, which nonetheless help to explain the bigger 
picture. 
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Primary Sources 
 
The main primary sources used by this thesis are the official transcripts of the 
parliamentary sessions of the French National Assembly on the 28th, 29th and 30th of 
August 1954. The transcripts, six in total (one for each session, two on the 28th, three 
on the 29th and one on the 30th), are found in the database of the Centre virtuel de la 
connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE) of the University of Luxembourg and are therefore 
readily available. They are given weight for two main reasons: first, they constitute the 
most direct account of the debate leading to the crucial vote of the 30th of August 1954. 
History, namely the formulation of a decision on the EDC, was literally being made as 
the discussion progressed, and the reasons for the different choices taken by deputies 
are laid out clearly and rather in detail.  
Second, they are a source that, as far as the research conducted by this thesis has 
been able to find, has not been relied upon in a significant way before. Reasons for this 
neglect are probably due to the fact they have not been officially translated in English. 
Moreover, as underscored in the literature review of this thesis, the attention of scholars 
and historians has been drawn more heavily towards more intergovernmental sources, 
more concerned with negotiations and foreign policy. However, if we consider deputies 
as state leaders (which is plausible given their role), the transcripts are a useful source 
to probe the ideas and perceptions of such leaders (Rose, 1998), to the extent to which 
the deputies decided to express them.  
As already mentioned, by focusing its analysis on such transcripts, this thesis 
operates an important choice. Although the negotiations and debates leading to the 
sessions is taken in due consideration, it is important to stress the importance of the 
moment in which a final decision on the EDC was taken. This choice also serves to 
highlight how important the division of power (and, consequently, 
democratic/parliamentary legitimation) is when it comes to deciding the outcome of 
states’ foreign policy. Usually, in fact, the actions and behavior of diplomats are 
scrutinized in the literature whereas domestic parliamentary politics are somewhat 
neglected (Pastor-Castro, 2006). This thesis’ focus on the parliamentary debates held in 
the three days preceding the vote should demonstrate how discussions by 
democratically elected representatives within a state are essentially the difference 
between taking on a fundamental foreign policy commitment or renouncing it. 
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Discussion 
 
The Sessions on the 28th of August 
 
The first speaker of the session is Jules Moch, rapporteur of the Foreign Affairs 
Commission and author of a fundamental report on the EDC. He mentions leaders’ 
perceptions and feelings right away (28, I, p. 3), although somewhat rhetorically, saying 
it would be “degrading” to let old enmities cloud one’s judgment on the vote about to 
take place (28, I, p. 3).  
In line with neoclassical realist expectations, constitutional (domestic) concerns 
are the first argument against the ratification of the Treaty. According to Moch, the 
EDC Treaty is in contrast with a series of articles of the 1946 French Constitution (Art. 
17, 30, 47, 62). This shows how the «situation internationale»1 (28, I, p. 3) is filtered 
through the French domestic legal order and interacts with it in a meaningful way.  
Moch stresses how, while the government was favorable to ratification, all six 
parliamentary commissions called to study the Treaty were against it, highlighting the 
interplay among different domestic institutions. To motivate their opposition, Moch 
cites changes from the 1950 version of the Treaty (28, I, p. 5). He also laments that the 
conditions posed by the French government at the signature in 1952 were not respected 
(28, I, p. 6) and expresses concerns on the relative composition of the European army in 
terms of number of divisions, with 33% of the total formed by German divisions and 
less than 25% by French divisions.  
Moch regrets that, while threatening national sentiments, the EDC does not create 
a “substitutive” European spirit (28, I p. 7). Such considerations are telling for 
neoclassical realism since they show that ideational concerns were in fact part of the 
discussion. The problem, however, is determining whether these references were a 
rhetorical device or a sincere manifestation of the speaker’s conscience. 
The reasons against the Treaty given by Moch are detailed and they concern a 
series of irregularities in the content of the Treaty (28, I, pp. 14-15), its inadequateness 
given the scientific developments of nuclear warfare (28, I, pp. 9 and 15) and, in 
general, threats to France’s sovereignty (28, I, p. 10). 
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The rest of Moch’s speech is concerned with German rearmament and how the 
EDC constitutes a premature end to disarmament efforts (28, I, pp. 18-20). In ending 
his address to the Assembly, Moch advocates “peace through disarmament” (28, I, p. 
20) and he calls for renovating France’s role in a crusade for peace and «dans 
l’établissement de la sécurité désarmée»2 (28 August, I, p. 21). 
The second speaker is radical deputy Roger Gaborit. He divides his attention 
between the EDC Treaty and the Bonn-Paris Conventions of 1952. For him, the two are 
in many ways complementary. However, the passion (28, I, p. 21) shown for the EDC 
has eclipsed the importance of the other. He mentions the New York conference of 
1950 as the first instance in which the questions of Western European defense and 
German rearmament were seriously discussed. He receives applauses from his 
colleagues when he mentions that only France opposed such rearmament (28, I, p. 23).  
Gaborit underscores how French security is ensured by allied military presence in 
West Germany and that weakening this «dispositif défensif»3 (28, I, p. 23) would be 
dangerous. After enumerating the merits of the Bonn-Paris Conventions, he points out 
that Art. 11 of the Bonn Convention4 subordinates its coming into force to the 
ratification of the EDC Treaty (28, I, p. 29). For this reason, the Foreign Affairs 
Commission has decided not to take any decisions on the Bonn Conventions without 
first seeing the juridical effects of the EDC’s failure (28, I, p. 33).  
The next speaker is Raymond Triboulet, rapporteur for the Defense Commission. 
Triboulet briefly mentions the former Minister of Defense who resigned his position, 
showing the critical importance he attached to the EDC (28, I, p. 34). It is not clear 
whether this person is René Pleven (with mandate from 8 March 1952 to 19 June 1954) 
or his successor Marie-Pierre Kœnig (from 19 June 1954 to 14 August 1954), although 
some hints later in his speech give the idea that he was referring to Kœnig.  
To the question of whether the EDC would effectively ensure France’s defense, 
he answers that he sees the initiative as a method to rearm Germany (28, I, p. 35). After 
describing the status of NATO forces in Europe, Triboulet forecasts what changes the 
EDC might bring to that equilibrium. He establishes that no progress would come from 
the EDC from a military point of view (28, I, p. 35). Starting from considerations 
regarding the language used by integrated armies, he argues that “confederate” or 
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4 Officially Art. 11 of the Convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic 
of Germany (26 May 1952). 
Filippo Benghi filippo.benghi@outlook.it Student nr. 2109980 
20 
 
“coalition” armies are more valuable than the “integrated” ones that the EDC is 
designed to form (28, I, p. 36). To strengthen his point, Triboulet points at the absence 
of arguments for the effectiveness of military integration. Instead, he mentions reports 
and military treaties exposing the demerits of integrated divisions (28, I, p. 37). He 
conveys the remarks of an unnamed German Colonel who, acknowledging the 
necessity of “mixing”5 the troops, suggests that this mixture should happen in times of 
peace (28, I, p. 37). He then addresses the American view favorable to the EDC. In this 
regard, he cites an unnamed U.S. General who admitted that homogeneous armies bring 
more value than integrated corps. However, in that occasion the U.S. General also 
acknowledged that members of the military must undergo the “mixture” to limit 
German rearmament in some way (28, I, p. 38). 
Triboulet responds to the argument that voting for the EDC would always be 
better than voting for German rearmament saying that the EDC is, in fact, a way to 
rearm Germany (28, I, p. 38). Relating to this, the Defense rapporteur comments Art. 
68 paragraph 2 of the EDC Treaty. Such article prescribes that integration should take 
place in the way best warranting the effectiveness of the integrated units. For Triboulet, 
this wording opens the door for a myriad of exceptions (28, I, p. 39) and the fact that 
exceptions to integration must be authorized by the Council of Ministers with 
unanimous vote is not enough to make the Treaty more acceptable (28, I, p. 40). 
Furthermore, Triboulet claims that the EDC does not add enough novelty to the already 
existing structure of NATO and is therefore not necessary (28, I, p. 41). 
All in all, the Defense rapporteur gives a completely negative judgment of the 
EDC, indulging in detailed and circumscribed considerations (28, I, p. 42-45). His last 
two significative points regard both the impact that the EDC will have on the 
intercontinental role of France (28, I, p. 46) and the fear that lowering itself to the level 
of the other five continental nations would cost France its position of great power 
together with the U.S. and the United Kingdom.  
The second session begins with Max Lejeune, President of the Defense 
Commission. He states that the dichotomy between the creation of a new Wehrmacht 
and the integration of German forces within the EDC is a “false dilemma” (28, II, p. 3). 
He argues that the EDC would not only allow Germany to reconstitute its army, but that 
it would also dislocate France’s own (28, II, p. 3). He then carefully explains how the 
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EDC will lay the basis for the reconstruction of the German army, from the military, 
organizational and financial point of view. 
Lejeune despairs of the material possibility for France of matching the German 
contribution to the EDC, also considering the expenses already incurred to defend 
continental France and its overseas territories (28, II, p. 5). His words exemplify French 
fears towards the possible creation of a new Wehrmacht. He recalls the speed at which 
the German army under Hitler managed to reach the size of 66 divisions in 1939 
starting from 10 in 1933 to warn his colleagues of the potential threat posed by the new, 
“effectively German” corps allowed by the EDC (28, II, p. 6). He strengthens his point 
quoting former Waffen-SS General Arthur Ehrhardt affirming in March 1954 that the 
EDC was the quickest and most realistic way to reconstitute the German army (28, II, 
p. 6). He even quotes Chancellor Adenauer who manifested his view of the EDC as a 
mean to regain possession of Germany’s eastern territories (28, II, p. 7). Leujeune 
concludes that alternative solutions to the EDC would be better suited to ensure the 
security of Western Europe (28, II, p. 8).  
The word is given to Jean-Paul Palewski, rapporteur of the Justice Commission. 
He argues that, if ratified, the EDC Treaty will impose upon French citizens legal 
“texts” that do not stem from their own national codes (28, II, p. 8). To support this 
claim, he cites several jurists stressing how adopting the Treaty will alienate a great part 
of French national sovereignty and that it will “abrogate” a series of articles of the 1946 
Constitution (28, II, p. 9). Palewski then engages in a technical analysis of the 
consequences of the ratification of the Bonn Conventions and the EDC Treaty, 
especially for what regards the EDC Court of Justice’s jurisdiction. For instance, he 
mentions how, by receiving competences in the sphere of criminal law (as regards 
offenses committed by Members of the European defense forces), the EDC Treaty 
abandons the «règle de l’unité de la loi pénale»6 (28, II, p. 11). Moreover, Palewski 
fears that the special legal regimes to be applied to the European defense forces 
(subtracting them from local and national criminal law) would serve as a pretext for 
anti-militaristic uprisings against them, in a similar fashion to the sentiments felt 
towards U.S. troops in Europe (28, II, p. 12).  
These and other intrusions and distortions caused by the adoption of the EDC 
Treaty are addressed. Always from a juridical point of view, the EDC Court of Justice 
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is seen as potentially interfering with the political equilibrium of powers within the 
Member States (28, II, p. 13). The EDC Treaty is then described as having 
consequences on a series of domains of domestic law, including family law. Finally, 
Palewski affirms that, rather than being a step towards a truly European legal order 
(comprising Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon and Slavic elements in addition to Germanic 
and Latin ones), the EDC only delays the creation of such a structure (28, II, p. 17). 
The word is given to Vincent de Moro-Giafferri, President of the Justice 
Commission. He begins noting that the French Constitution does authorize limitations 
to national sovereignty in the interest of peace (28, II, p. 17). However, he fears that the 
German contribution to the EDC would be preponderant and that there would be no 
reciprocity, as the Constitution would require (28, II, p. 17). Namely, Germany would 
benefit disproportionately from, and France would be harmed disproportionately by 
integration. De Moro-Giafferri then draws a parallel between the EDC vote and the 
decision of the United States not to ratify the Treaty of Versailles for fear that the 
League of Nations would infringe on their sovereignty. With this parallel, he 
establishes a hierarchy between internal and external legal obligations (28, II, p. 17). 
All in all, de Moro-Giafferri’s opinion of the consequences of the EDC ratification for 
France’s sovereignty are negative, supported by evidence of inequality among Member 
States (28, II, p. 19-20). 
The word is given to Max Brusset, rapporteur of the Finance Commission. He 
estimates the expenses attributable to the EDC to be around 10 billion US dollars (28, 
II, p. 20). Despite mentioning that the budget of the EDC is prepared by the 
Commissariat in consultation with the governments of the Member States, Brusset 
enumerates the financial problems linked to the EDC. He argues that by excluding 
national parliaments from budgetary control (regarding the resources required by the 
EDC and their intended use), the Treaty would go around an essential prerogative of the 
legislative branch (28, II, p. 22). As regards the role of governments, he sees the veto in 
the Council only as a cause for paralysis of the community, without bringing to any 
meaningful solution to decision-making stalemates (28, II, p. 23). He voices 
reservations about assigning control on the use of funds to a supranational 
Commissariat, with priorities that are necessarily different from those of the Member 
States (28, II, p. 23). He stresses how letting the Council decide the budgetary 
contributions of Member States following the NATO procedure is also unadvisable, 
given that this procedure itself does not provide enough guarantees (28, II, p. 24).  
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Brusset details the economic dispositions of the Treaty, underscoring how they all 
point to ever-growing losses of sovereignty (28, II, p. 25-26). He makes the following 
consideration: apart from paying its contribution to the EDC budget, each Member 
State will be asked, following the decisions of the Commissariat, to contribute to the 
equipment of the integrated forces. Thus, national war industries will be charged with 
orders to produce and sell war industry products. However, he mentions how 
differences in prices of such products in the Member States might affect the “real” 
magnitude of such orders. Regarding this, he notes how German industrial prices are 
consistently lower than French ones by 15%, 20% or even 30% (28, II, p. 26). He then 
considers differences in the fiscal regimes and the wage rates that put France at a 
disadvantage, limiting the return on production and sales of war industry products to 
85% of initial budget contributions (the minimum possible value, 28, II, p. 27). The 
resulting loss of 15% would then go to aggravate France’s deficit problems.  
According to Brusset, the economic aspects of the EDC would let West Germany 
abuse non-discrimination clauses, while France would be economically harmed and 
even deprived of the possibility of arming its national forces without the authorization 
of the Commissariat (28, II, p. 29). In general, Brusset warns the Assembly about what 
he defines as the «emprise du commissariat sur la vie économique du pays»7 (28, II, p. 
30). His successive remarks are considerations of the role of a supranational executive 
in a common market, exercising a disproportionate control on competition (28, II, p. 
30), mixed with opinions on the remuneration of military personnel (again determined 
by the Commissariat) and the relative tax rules (28, II, p. 31). Interestingly, in ending 
his speech, Brusset specifies that despite the importance of the economic consequences 
of the EDC, they are dwarfed by the fundamental choice that the Treaty entails in terms 
of foreign policy (28, II, p. 31). 
 
The Sessions on the 29th of August 
 
The session begins with the speech of Pierre-Olivier Lapie, rapporteur of the 
Industry Commission. He considers the ratification of the EDC Treaty impossible and 
states that his Commission voted 22 to 9 against it, agreeing with the opinions 
expressed by Moch in his report (29, I, p. 2). He justifies his views mentioning fear that 
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Germany might want to reclaim its old territories (29, I, p. 2) and then summarizing the 
points made by Palewski on the dangerous effects of the Treaty on domestic law.  
He goes back to articles 100-111 of the Treaty, singling them out as a source of 
“penetration” in the French economy (29, I, p.3). While understanding the motivations 
that brought previous governments to negotiate the EDC, he describes how, starting 
from a draft series of articles on organization and strategy, the negotiators went on to 
include provisions on armaments, infrastructure and all military-related industries, such 
as the textile one (29, I, p. 4). For Lapie, such an expansive range of responsibilities, 
quickly laid out in just 10 articles, gives the Commissariat excessive power over both 
the material and intellectual (research and development) capabilities of France. 
Lapie reports that his commission has discussed the extent to which France’s 
industrial sector will be “integrated”, ranging from 3% to 20% (29, I, p. 5). The 
problem lies in the difficulty of drawing the line between the civil and military aspects 
of many industrial production sectors, such as the automobile industry. All these 
strategically important industries will undergo the checks, sanctions and orders (29, I, 
p. 6) of the Commissariat. He notes that the advantages in terms of competition 
stemming from an integrated industry (namely lower prices) go to the advantage of the 
Commissariat placing the orders; a thought-provoking way of responding to arguments 
advocating economic integration (Krugman, Obstfeld, Melitz, 2018). He goes even 
further mentioning the disproportionate advantages that integration gives to modern, 
specialized industries, while disrupting older ones (29, I, p.6). It is tempting to see here 
a reformulation of classical arguments against trade integration, strengthened by 
suspicions towards supranational military integration and the Commissariat’s agenda 
(29, I, p. 6).  
Regarding Germany, Lapie thinks that it is in the best position to benefit from the 
Treaty, given the quantity and quality of its industrial installations for producing 
machinery and equipment material (29, I, p.7). The limitations provided for in art. 107 
of the EDC Treaty to the types of armaments that Germany can produce are not enough 
and they are liable to be removed by the Council, even overruling a French veto (29, I, 
p. 8). All in all, Lapie fears sacrifices on the part of the French economy, matched by a 
rapid development of the German war industry.  
Word is given to Sourou Apithy, rapporteur for the Overseas Territories 
Commission and West African-born. He argues that, being linked with the political 
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aspects of a future United Europe, the EDC Treaty has serious repercussions on the 
French colonial empire and raises several complex issues (29, I, p. 10).  
Apithy maintains that the EDC Treaty is clearly unconstitutional, in that Art. 2 of 
the 1946 Constitution assigns to the French government the coordination of the means 
and the political direction of France’s defense (29, I, p. 10). For him, the 13 million 
square kilometers forming France’s overseas territories set it apart from countries such 
as Germany and Italy. The Constitution of 1946 granted French citizenship to 43 
million people, the majority of which were Africans, without distinction of race or 
religion, making the overseas territories an integral part of the Union Française, the 
“French Union” (29, I, pp. 10-11). He recalls the war efforts carried out by these 
territories between 1940 and 1942, mentioning the autochthonous formations who 
fought against the Italians in Tunisia and other campaigns (29, I, p. 11). He then 
comments that such sacrifices were forgotten when negotiating the EDC Treaty, 
relegating the Overseas Territories to a secondary role, as if they were an “annex” of 
the mainland8 (29, I, p. 11). 
Apithy reiterates worries regarding the loss of a purely French army, the 
unconstitutionality of the Treaty, and the loss of national control over the community to 
a fully-fledged supranational authority, endowed with foreign policy roles, citing Art. 
93 and 99 of the Treaty (29, I, p. 12). He draws a parallel between the special tribunals 
that the Community will have at its disposal and those controlled by the Church in the 
Middle Ages, noting however that the Church did not have the military means of 
coercion that the Treaty envisages for the EDC (29, I, p. 12). Although debatable, these 
arguments highlight the intensity and earnestness of the feelings of mistrust 
experienced by French deputies. 
Apithy maintains that integrating continental France within a European 
Community would halt the participation of the overseas territories to French national 
sovereignty, disrupting the cohesion of the French Union (29, I, p. 13). That is, the 
European commitment of France with respect to the EDC is at odds with its extra-
European commitment (29, I, p. 14) and there is no solution to this conflict: if the 
Republic is dissolved in a European supranational entity, non-European French 
territories will have to become “attached” to another sovereign entity or gain 
independence. On the other hand, integrating African regions in the European 
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Community as an integral part of the French Union benefits the most those countries 
not having colonies anymore, but willing to regain a colonial role, such as Italy and 
Belgium. In his opinion, this explains why the Treaty tends toward integrating the 
overseas territories in the Community. Relating to this, he then mentions how Art. 120 
of the EDC Treaty would allow African recruits to become part of the integrated 
European army (29, I, p. 15).  
Apithy fears that, if integrated, the overseas territories would lose their French 
character. He stresses that France should have more rights on those territories, despite 
European partners and many of the citizens of the overseas territories leaning towards 
complete integration in the Community (29, I, p. 16). In short, Apithy favors a retention 
of French control over its former colonies both to maintain France’s role as a great 
power and to preserve the cohesion of the French Union. Thus, the Committee he 
represents is against ratification (29, I, p. 18). 
It is the turn of Pierre Mendès-France, President of the Council of Ministers and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. He reclls that he made the task of the French government 
to explain the preoccupations of the French to their partners (29, I, p. 19). He is 
displeased that no compromise has been found in the Assembly in preparation for the 
EDC vote. Interestingly, Mendès-France affirms that it is unrealistic to strive for 
agreement among the different points of view within France, if there is no “external” 
agreement with its European partners (29, I, p. 20). This seems to suggest a sort of 
hierarchy in Mendès-France’s perspective, or at least it strategically depicts external 
agreements as having priority over internal cohesion.  
After that, Mendès-France discusses the main points characterizing previous 
intergovernmental negotiations. He stresses how, after the terms of the agreement with 
France’s five partners were accepted in 1952, a united front of five foreign powers (the 
“partners”) had formed, isolating France (29, I, p. 21). The reason for this, by 
admission of foreign leaders themselves, was exasperation for the hesitation shown by 
France, together with the continuous concessions asked by Paris, especially after four 
of the partners had already ratified the treaty. Mendès-France had to reassure European 
leaders that the EDC Treaty would have been ratified if some last concessions were 
given (29, I, p. 22). Such concessions form the basis for a series of protocols to be 
added to the main Treaty proposed by France starting from 1953. To justify these 
additions, Mendès-France underlines how governments, situations and «équilibres de 
forces» (29, I, p. 24) have changed since 1952. He then goes on discussing the contents 
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of these protocols. Requirements such as the subordination of the EDC to NATO or the 
possibility of exiting the EDC were necessary to assuage a portion of French deputies 
(29, I, p. 24). One of the most remarkable provisions contained in the protocols 
regarded the possibility of dissolving the EDC in case the United Kingdom or the U.S. 
substantially reduced their contribution to European defense (29, I, p. 25). The words of 
Mendès-France in this regard confirm the views expressed by Creswell (2002). 
The Prime Minister then focuses on the aspects of the negotiations concerning the 
German question (29, I, p. 25). The central problem is for him the right, attributed to 
the Federal Republic, to leave the EDC in the event of its reunification. The fact that 
Germany alone was granted this right had created discontent among the negotiating 
parties. Given the undesirability of both a right to leave the community accorded to 
everyone and a right for Germany alone, the parties agreed to a declaration that, to the 
day of the session, still did not clarify sufficiently who had or did not have a right to 
leave the EDC (28, I, p. 26).  
Then, Mendès-France addresses the other great question included in the 
protocols, namely supranationalism. The President stresses how a supranational 
authority is necessary for the EDC to function properly (29, I, p. 28). However, he also 
recognizes the need for warranties as regards topics as sensitive as military integration. 
He defends the technical structure envisaged for the EDC by the Treaty, commending 
the qualities of the people who will form the Commissariat (29, I, p. 29). He stresses 
that, to ensure that no measure taken by the Commissariat will harm the interests of any 
Member State, the possibility of bringing certain matters before the EDC Council of 
Ministers was included in the Treaty. To respond to the critique that the right to veto a 
decision of the Commissariat might be abused, Mendès-France mentions the role of the 
Court of Justice in determining whether, regarding a certain decision, the affected 
interests of the vetoing Member State are vital or not (29, I, p. 29). Against fears that 
even this procedure might be abused, he underscores that most operative decisions 
within the EDC are taken by subordinate authorities, rather than the Commissariat, and 
that key military decisions would be more relevant to NATO than the EDC (29, I, 
p.30). Remarkably, according to Mendès-France, members of the Commissariat must 
not be defended from the accuse of being supranational bureaucrats. Rather, they must 
be shielded from the critique that they are expressions of a certain country, necessarily 
drawn to make that country’s interests (29, I, p. 32). 
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Recent (post-1952) intergovernmental negotiations also revolved around the 
possibility for the Commissariat to bring a country before the Court of Justice. France 
was opposed to this, but, isolated, finally conceded on the condition that the matter be 
brought to the Council of Ministers before any judiciary procedure (29, I, p. 32). 
Mendès-France enumerates the concessions given by France, concerning the transition 
period before the EDC is to become fully functional and the characteristics of the Court 
of Justice (29, I, p. 33-34). Finally, he addresses a series of technical military matters 
that saw France and Germany striving to find a suitable compromise (29, I, p. 35).  
The second session on August 29 continues Mendès-France’s account of the 
latest negotiation phases. He mentions a “special military agreement”, the content of 
which he cannot fully disclose (29, II, p. 3). He stresses, however, that no secret 
agreement has been signed or annexed to the Treaties (29, II, p. 3). The special 
agreement simply provided for a permanent 14-to-12 proportion to the number of 
French and German divisions respectively, but was not accepted (29, II, p. 4). He deals 
with the problem of the EDC’s budget, underscoring how important the control of 
national Parliaments is. Such control was the object of negotiations with France’s 
partners, but could not be obtained (29, II, p. 5).  
Mendès-France then addresses the problems linked with military procurement, 
namely that given the higher prices of industrial products in France, real demand for 
French war-industry products will be relatively lower (29, II, p.5). The solution he 
proposed was to calculate French prices net of indirect taxation (much higher in France 
than in other Members of the Community). This proposal, however, was not accepted 
(29, II, p. 7). 
Other concessions asked by France were: the participation of the United Kingdom 
to discussions regarding it within the EDC; the assurance not to be bound to form a 
future political community as provided for in Art. 38 of the EDC Treaty; and the 
guarantee that, in agreement with Art. 126 of the Treaty, a conference will be held after 
a year to study eventual modifications to the Treaty proposed by national parliaments 
(29, II, p. 8).  
Mendès-France weighs the advantages and disadvantages of the EDC Treaty’s 
ratification. He states that, if the Treaty were ratified, West Germany would be bound 
to the Western bloc (29, II, p. 11), and this would also ensure Franco-German 
rapprochement. If the Treaty were not ratified, instead, Germany’s rearmament will not 
be regulated. Furthermore, the UK and the U.S. had already made clear that in case of 
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failed ratification, they would take steps to return full sovereignty to the Federal 
Republic, as envisaged by the Bonn-Paris Conventions of 1952 (29, II, p. 12). For 
Mendès-France, such a development is unavoidable, whether the EDC Treaty is ratified 
or not (29, II, p. 13), but he warns about uncertainty in how the rearmament of 
Germany will be carried out if not in the forms envisaged by the EDC (29, II, p. 13). 
Some points are raised by the deputies. Jacques Fonlupt-Esperaber, member of 
the centrist Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP), argues that only two alternatives 
are present: the integrated Army or a reconstituted German Army, with the latter being 
the worst option (29, II, p. 14). Pierre André, opposed to the EDC, proclaims that the 
EDC is even worse than the old Wehrmacht (29, II, p. 14). Mendès-France continues 
stressing the importance of giving a clear answer to the Allies and the inevitability of 
Germany’s participation to European defense (29, II, p. 15). He laments his difficult 
position of being pressed for answers by France’s partners, while also being criticized 
by a vast array of parliamentary groups, including EDC supporters (29, II, p. 16).  
He is adamant in defending the commitment of France to NATO as the 
cornerstone of French foreign policy. To ensure that such policy is carried out properly, 
he stresses the importance of addressing “internal” problems first, such as the conflict 
in Indochina, the French economic situation and reforms in Northern Africa (29, II, p. 
17). He concludes recalling the importance of France’s relationship with the United 
Kingdom and the necessity of ensuring Franco-German reconciliation within a 
European framework (29, II, p. 17). 
The word is given to Adolphe Aumeran, deputy for Algiers. He argues that the 
EDC as negotiated in 1950 is outdated, also because of the strategic importance gained 
by nuclear arsenals (29, II, p. 18). He stresses that such weaponry makes the re-creation 
of a German Army pointless from the point of view of European defense and he is not 
convinced that France’s Atlantic allies will directly or indirectly rearm Germany 
without France’s consent. Moreover, he argues that fears of negative repercussions of a 
failed ratification are unfounded. He sees the EDC as benefitting the Anglo-Saxon 
powers at the detriment of France (29, II, p. 19). He argues that Germany has been 
made the pillar of European integration because of the readiness of the Germans to 
cooperate with the U.S., and the ties stemming from 30 million Americans being of 
“Germanic origin”9 (29, II, p. 20).  
                                                             
9 Original: «d’origine germanique», possibly translatable in English as “Germanic ancestry”. 
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Aumeran gives his version of the argument according to which European defense 
against the Soviets is no longer necessary given the changes occurred in U.S. foreign 
policy regarding Europe (29, II, p. 21). His predictions for the future after a rearmament 
of Germany are bleak, explained by the insufficient weight of a German Army against 
the Soviet war machine, its inability to deal with nuclear warfare, and the selfishness of 
the U.S. in ensuring “its own health”10 in case of conflict (29, II, p. 22). All in all, his 
ideas on German rearmament are very hostile towards the Federal Republic. His 
critiques extend to the history and culture of Germany, although the original transcript 
cites the date of German unification as 1807 instead of 1870 and it is difficult to discern 
whether this is due to a typo or a mistake of the speaker (29, II, p. 24).  
Aumeran then proposes a question préalable, or “preliminary question” (29, II, p. 
26). This consists of a procedure by which the Assembly must decide whether to 
deliberate on a matter present on the agenda or not. According to Art. 46 of the 1946 
French Constitution, if the Assembly were to decide not to vote on EDC ratification, 
debate on the Treaty itself would be avoided (29, II, p. 26). This passage is particularly 
significative since now opponents of the EDC think there is no need to have a debate on 
the Treaty. They are therefore in favor of the question préalable, knowing that they 
have a majority. Proponents of the EDC are instead against the question and one of 
them, Alfred Chupin, tries to save the situation by posing a prejudicial motion. If 
approved, it will suspend the session and require the government to re-open 
negotiations. Chupin hopes this will help form a majority within the Assembly in favor 
of the EDC. However, his motion will backfire spectacularly: after having retired his 
question, Aumeran will propose it again to prevent Chupin’s motion from further 
postponing a decision on the EDC. Aumeran’s motion, taking precedence over 
Chupin’s, will be voted, meaning automatic rejection of the bill originally being 
discussed without a debate.  
The third and last session on August 29 begins with Foreign Affairs Commission 
President Daniel Mayer. He indulges for the most part in procedural matters (29, III, p. 
1-4) but is however in favor of a debate and against Aumeran’s proposal (29, III, p. 4). 
Convinced by him, Aumeran, Delbez and Caillez, proponents of the preliminary 
question that would quash debate on the EDC (29, III, p. 6-7) initially retire their 
motion, as mentioned above. 
                                                             
10 Original: «son propre salut». 
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Word is given to Pierre Lebon, deputy of the Gaullist RPF. He laments that 
despite being named “European”, the EDC only comprises six European states (29, III, 
p. 9). Then he criticizes the way in which the Treaty has been structured, pointing out 
that it mixes short-term instruments to defend Europe in case of attack with the long-
term organization of a Community (29, III, p. 9). He points out that the countries 
France is supposed to merge with within the EDC were either its enemies or 
diplomatically neutral in the past conflict (29, III, p. 9). In a similar way to Aumeran, 
he describes the enmity between Germany and France as being old, dating back to 
1792, year in which Prussian troops passed the frontier of Revolutionary France to aid 
their Austrian ally. As Lebon affirms that German military aggressiveness against 
France has even older origins, another deputy exclaims the name of Attila (29, III, p. 
10). Lebon is convinced that the EDC will give back to Germany the means to 
reconquer its lost territories (29, III, p. 10). He then dismantles a series of arguments 
favorable to the EDC. In particular, he diminishes fears of isolation for France in case 
of failed ratification (29, III, p. 11) and he advocates a French leadership role in 
Europe, as opposed to integration through the Treaties (29, III, p. 12).  
It is the turn of René Mayer, former President of the Council of Ministers. He 
maintains that rejecting the EDC will not solve the problem of German rearmament. 
Rather, it will deprive France of any control over it (29, III, p. 13). He mildly criticizes 
President Mendès-France for his conduct in previous negotiations. The two discuss, 
especially regarding a point: according to Mayer, the protocols proposed by Mendès-
France would allow Germany to veto France’s decision to send troops to North-Africa 
by virtue of its “vital interests”. Mendès-France explains that such a decision would not 
have to be submitted to the Commissariat. Therefore, such a dispatch of troops could 
not be prevented, despite the wording of Art. 13 of the Treaty, thanks to the Protocol of 
24 March 1953 (29, III, p. 15-16). 
Mayer then defends the conditions that the EDC envisages for the Franco-
German relationship, presenting them as very accommodating to France. He then 
argues that it is better to change something about the French Army through the EDC 
than to have an autonomous German Army through NATO (29, III, p. 17). He notes 
that, despite gaining the ability to train troops through the EDC, Germany would not 
have the freedom to set its military budget or even the number of its own troops (29, III, 
p. 17). This, according to Mayer, constitutes the main difference between the EDC and 
a new German Army. He recognizes further that German rearmament, one way or 
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another, is inevitable (29, III, p. 18). He then stresses the importance of a united Europe 
as an interlocutor with both the Soviet Union and the other Western powers (29, III, p. 
20), reflecting on the possible reactions of the United States to a rejection of the EDC. 
He underscores that France’s foreign policy should not be based on feelings and that 
old hostilities should be forgotten. He cites the example of Belgium, which, despite 
having been invaded and having suffered because of the war, was now among the 
staunchest supporters of the EDC (29, III, p. 21). He concludes saying that refusing the 
EDC without plausible alternatives is irresponsible. 
Alfred Coste-Floret, Christian Democrat, agrees with President Mendès-France 
that the problem of German rearmament will resurface again in case the EDC is 
rejected (29, III, p. 22). He acknowledges the need of a European Army, and he 
describes the consequences of nuclear warfare in the two different cases of the absence 
or presence of the EDC. This is an interesting argument, providing an answer to the one 
proposed by Aumeran, namely that nuclear warfare makes the EDC useless. Coste-
Floret explains, using technical data, that without access to German aerial space to 
detect incoming nuclear bombers, French interceptors would not be able to neutralize 
the attack in time (29, III, p. 24). Instead, with the EDC in place, France would be 
warned of an attack in time to intervene.  
Coste-Floret then reiterates that if, as many colleagues argue, German 
rearmament is inevitable, it would be better to have it within the EDC framework than 
otherwise (29, III, p. 24). For him, the main problem dividing his colleagues is the 
suspect of an inequality of rights inherent to the Treaty in favor of Germany. He 
proceeds to demonstrate why this is not the case, recalling that Art. 10 of the Treaty 
allows France to maintain a national army for the defense of its overseas territories (29, 
III, p. 25). Furthermore, Art. 107 prohibits Germany to produce weapons of mass 
destruction, while the 1952 Bonn-Paris Conventions forbid the fabrication of airplanes 
even for civil aviation purposes. This, confronted with a scenario in which Germany 
autonomously rearms through NATO, appears to be more advantageous for France. 
Regarding supranationalism, Coste-Floret argues that the modifications proposed 
by President Mendès-France have greatly empowered the Council of Ministers and the 
more intergovernmental aspects of decision-making (29, III, p. 26). He sees this as 
resembling more the structure of NATO, weakening the supranational nature of the 
EDC and making it not just less effective, but also giving Germany more authority on 
the use of integrated troops in the form of veto power. He uses his arguments to 
Filippo Benghi filippo.benghi@outlook.it Student nr. 2109980 
33 
 
criticize the strategy of President Mendès-France, which will lead to an immediate 
German rearmament without any meaningful concession to France (29, III, p. 28). 
Instead, he recommends loyalty to the founding principles of the EDC Treaty, seen as 
the best possible alternative to ensure Franco-German reconciliation and the 
neutralization of the threat of German militarism (29, III, p. 28-29). 
 
The Session on the 30th of August 
 
The Assembly discusses the “preliminary question”, newly deposited by 
Aumeran. As explained by Christian Pineau, the procedural problem revolves around 
two different motions: a prejudicial motion by Alfred Chupin asking the Assembly to 
suspend the session (de facto putting off the debate until new negotiations at Brussels 
have taken place, 30, I, p. 12); and Aumeran’s question préalable, having the object of 
completely shutting down the debate on the EDC before all speakers have intervened 
(30, I, p. 7). As noted by Daniel Mayer (30, I, p. 10), President of the Foreign Affairs 
Commission, the discussion has now veered artificially on these two procedural 
motions and whether they should be discussed. Mayer criticizes the Government for not 
being more active in the discussion and for not having been able to form a strong 
majority within the Assembly (30, I, p. 17). 
Mendès-France responds explaining the reasons of the Government’s 
ineffectiveness at the Parliamentary level. He mentions the importance held by foreign 
policy, how he considers it the main area where consensus must be found and the main 
source of security for France (30, I, p. 19). He refuses to further modify the Treaty and 
he asks Chupin to withdraw his motion, so that Aumeran will also withdraw his (30, I, 
p. 21). 
Chupin, however, sees his motion as necessary to gather a majority to move 
forward with the objectives of the Assembly. Namely, protecting Western Europe, 
contributing to German reunification, making sure that Germany participates in the 
common defense of Europe and laying the foundations of economic and political 
integration (30, I, p. 22). In short, he asks the government to re-open negotiations, 
ensuring that the additional protocol is accepted by the partners and only then re-open 
the discussion in the Assembly. Given that he does not intend to withdraw his motion, 
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Aumeran’s preliminary question is discussed, and word is given to Édouard Herriot, 
former President of the Council of Ministers and President of the Assembly. 
Herriot is in principle favorable to a debate, but, as an opponent of the EDC, he 
sees Aumeran’s motion as the last chance for his group to make their opinion known 
(30, I, p. 24). He sees the unsolved question of the Saar and the lack of British 
participation in the negotiations as grounds to reject the EDC (30, I, p. 25). He judges 
the sacrifices in terms of sovereignty asked to France to be unfair given the advantages 
that the EDC gives to Germany, an argument very similar to that of others among his 
colleagues (30, I, p. 26). He is convinced that a national army is a prerequisite for the 
existence of a national diplomacy (30, I, p. 26). Herriot considers the independence of 
the Commissariat from national interests (laid out in Art. 20 of the Treaty) as 
monstrous and ridiculous, accusing future commissars of disloyalty towards their own 
countries (30, I, p. 27).  
Then, he cites Bidault and Eden to demonstrate how the foreign policies of 
France, Great Britain and the U.S. are geared towards ensuring German sovereignty and 
freedom, something he sees as pointing necessarily to the reestablishment of the 
Wehrmacht (30, I, p. 28). The EDC Treaty allows Germany to regain freedom and 
strength, it gives it the right to eventually leave the Community, while weakening 
France, depriving it of its sovereignty and preventing it to leave the EDC at the same 
time (30, I, p. 29). He stresses that, according to a communiqué from the Brussels 
Conference, the right to leave the EDC is conditional upon a decrease of British and 
U.S. involvement in European defense (30, I, p. 29), but not for Germany.  
In defense of the preliminary question, Herriot thinks that there are no changes to 
the Treaty and the annexed documents that are worth discussing (30, I, p. 32). He thinks 
that it is not because of formal agreements that the EDC will fail, but because of the 
widely shared conviction that the EDC would be the end of France (30, I, p. 32-33). He 
then reiterates the thought that nuclear warfare makes the structure of the EDC 
superfluous (30, I, p. 33-34). He compares the possibility, given to Germany by Art. 11 
of the Treaty, of having its own police forces to an expedient to have a “supplementary 
Army”, recalling the memory of German occupation, where the German military proper 
was accompanied by authentic “hangmen”11 (here he probably refers to the Gestapo, 
30, I, p. 35). Then, Herriot makes the interesting remark that an Army should have a 
                                                             
11 Original: «bourreaux». 
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soul and that in his opinion the integrated EDC Army would not have one (30, I, p. 35). 
He also expresses the opinion that an Army is the soul of a country. 
Word is given to socialist deputy Christian Pineau, opposing the preliminary 
question. He analyzes the feelings some of his colleagues share towards Germany. He 
affirms that, despite having been a prisoner for two years, he is not hostile towards the 
Germans (30, I, p. 38). He asks why the French would have less trust in the Germans 
than in the Russians, as Herriot does. He regrets that the Assembly must spend so much 
time debating procedures instead of the subject at hand and supports the decision of 
sending Mendès-France to Brussels for new negotiations, as required by Chupin’s 
procedural motion (30, I, p. 41-42).  
Votes are cast for Aumeran’s preliminary question. The question is accepted for 
319 votes against 264. Consequently, the bill for the ratification of the EDC is rejected 
(30, I, p. 45). 
 
Thoughts and Observations 
 
The analysis of the National Assembly sessions on EDC ratification produces 
important results. Quantitatively, 12 of the 18 main speakers were against the EDC. 
Qualitatively, their most recurrent arguments were by far fears of German rearmament, 
followed by imbalances and inequality among the Member States. Other arguments 
play a relatively minor role and are only discussed by specific rapporteurs. Remarks 
regarding the role of the Anglo-Saxon powers, most notably by Herriot, are strangely 
sporadic, which apparently contradicts Creswell’s (2002) focus on the role of the U.S.  
As for the secondary literature, this analysis finds support for Lüthy’s (1954) 
description of the socio-political climate in France in the period before the vote, 
especially for what regards sentiments towards Germany. From a historical point of 
view, it is shown how postponement was one of the causes that brought both France’s 
partners and its deputies to abandon the EDC, as argued by Fursdon (1980). This is 
made evident by Mendès-France (29, I, p. 21). In contrast to Fursdon’s (1980) view, 
however, the transcripts show how despite his influence, the Prime Minister was 
ultimately “defeated” by the Assembly. 
The transcripts validate Creswell’s (2002) views on the efficiency-seeking plans 
of the U.S. for European defense. However, they are only briefly mentioned in the 
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three-days debate here analyzed and cannot be said to have had a fundamental impact. 
Differently from what Creswell (2002) says, French deputies did perceive the EDC as 
an attempt to force German rearmament upon France. Relating to this, fears or German 
rearmament do eclipse concerns for lost independence and supranationalism, posing an 
objection to Creswell’s and Trachtenberg’s (2003) underlying argument. Interestingly, 
these fears are accompanied by concerns for France’s Constitution, its legal order, the 
foreseen changes brought by the EDC and the deputies’ perceptions of the relative 
material capabilities of France and Germany.  
To the defense of the sources used, the underlying reasons of the EDC’s demise 
seem to vary depending on the event that is singled out as its cause. In this respect, 
scholars face two alternatives: either they undertake a circumscribed, “clinical” study of 
the direct legal and historical causes of an event; or they form an overarching macro-
theory incorporating innumerable variables to explain it. Given that most authors have 
chosen the second option, this thesis contributes to the debate selecting the first one. In 
the end, the difference between the two can be explained through a convenient 
metaphor: explaining the EDC’s failure is like determining the cause of a patient’s 
death. One physician might argue that it is due to excessive smoking and another one to 
lung cancer. They would be both partially right, the only difference between their 
diagnoses being the breadth of their scope. As for this thesis, its scope is on the meeting 
point (and the resulting interplay) of the three fundamental variables used by 
neoclassical realism to explain foreign policy: international incentives, domestic 
variables and policy-makers’ perceptions (Rose, 1998). 
For what regards international incentives, the most concerning for the deputies 
are not the ones linked to the U.S.-USSR Cold War equilibrium. Rather, they are by far 
those having to do with German rearmament. The overwhelming majority of the 
arguments against the EDC hinge almost solely on the idea that the EDC is a way to 
rearm Germany, as argued for instance by Lejeune and Herriot. These almost dwarf 
other concerns such as the need for the participation of the UK in the negotiations or 
even the matter of France’s war in Indochina, briefly brought up by Mendès-France 
(29, II, p. 17). This appears to contradict the point raised by Aimaq (1996). Indochina 
may have played a role in dictating France’s behavior during the negotiations. 
However, it did not play any meaningful part in determining the EDC’s ultimate defeat. 
Regarding domestic matters, it is difficult to say whether France’s defense should 
be considered one of them. Therefore, this thesis uses it as a bridge to connect 
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international incentives with domestic factors. Starting from Triboulet (28, I, 5-37), 
opponents of the EDC argue that the Treaty would be either useless or detrimental. 
Some, such as Moch, Aumeran and Herriot, stress its inability to deal with nuclear 
warfare, while others mention the handicap it would pose to the French military. 
Interestingly, such handicaps are often correlated with the disproportionate advantages 
it gives to Germany. 
An interesting point is made by Mendès-France, the diplomatic protagonist of the 
negotiations. For him, finding agreement with France’s partners takes preeminence 
over building internal consensus (29, I, p. 20). This would be a point in favor of 
research on the intergovernmental aspects of the EDC negotiations (Konde, 2013). If 
only this had proven to be a winning strategy for Mendès-France, which it did not. 
More than his words, facts show that domestic dynamics took preeminence over 
diplomacy. 
Another interesting point regarding the international dimension of the EDC 
Treaty is the conditionality of the right to leave in case of a reduction of British or U.S. 
contributions to European defense (30, I, p. 29). This deserves greater speculation on 
the part of realist scholars. Does this mean that military integration is positively 
correlated with U.S. commitment? Is American presence a precondition for cooperation 
in Europe? For some of the deputies of August 1954, this was the case.  
A topic mostly ignored by previous literature is the economic impact of the EDC. 
In the National Assembly, Brusset and Lapie point out the difficulties that the EDC 
would bring in terms of unemployment and internal demand. They point out the lower 
competitiveness of the French war industry with respect to the German one (28, II, p. 
25-26). This argument, an iteration of the “infant industry argument” brought up to 
oppose trade or economic integration (Elhanan, Krugman, 1989; Baldwin, Wyplosz, 
2015), has not been given much attention regarding the EDC. However, the fact that 
two parliamentary Commissions (Finance and Industry) had to deal with these issues 
signals that it was influential. 
Another element seldom studied in the literature are constitutional matters. The 
impact of the EDC Treaty on the French constitutional order is debated by Moch, 
Palewski, de Moro-Giafferri and Apithy, becoming a recurring theme. Different 
deputies highlight different areas in which the EDC conflicts with the French 
Constitution, from purely military matters, such as the appointment of generals, to the 
prerogative of parliament for what regards the national budget (Art. 16-17, 
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Constitution, 1946). This is how the primary sources testify to the main neoclassical 
realist assumption; namely, that international “incentives” are filtered through domestic 
factors. In this case, the result of negotiations carried out by the government had to 
undergo the scrutiny of parliamentary commissions. Even more compellingly, the 
failure of the EDC hinged on parliamentary procedures, namely the adoption of a 
preliminary question. 
A problem researchers encounter is that of determining where international 
factors end, and domestic ones begin. After all, from a philosophical perspective, a state 
cannot be really separated from the international system in which it finds itself. To 
decide whether the Foreign Affairs Commission presided by D. Mayer should be 
considered a “domestic” or an “international” factor is probably impossible to do. Such 
distinctions only serve as broad guidelines and should not be interpreted dogmatically 
by IR thinkers, lest they develop theories that are impossible to verify. 
The same is true when it comes to the psychological aspects of neoclassical 
realism. As this analysis has shown, feelings and personal views play a substantial role 
in the discussions of August 1954. They are either evoked rhetorically (28, I, p.3) or to 
get a point across to other deputies (30, I, p. 35). The problem with “perceptions”, 
however, is that they are difficult to measure and interpret. We can be reasonably 
certain of Herriot’s and Pineau’s sincerity when expressing their views on Germany 
given their personal experience. However, there is no way to know what their true 
“perceptions” are. To be fair, it is rather self-evident that leaders (deputies or 
politicians) experience the world in their own individual way. Nonetheless, it is 
difficult to successfully bring perceptions into the analysis without trespassing into 
other fields such as psychology or philosophy. How should we define “perceptions”? 
Why should a theory take individuals as the smallest possible unit in which decisions 
are taken? In other words, despite being correct in principle, a focus on perceptions 
opens an enormous series of problems that show the limits of IR theory as a discipline.  
Leaving aside this critique, the neorealist paradigm finds confirmation in the 
analysis of the National Assembly’s August 1954 sessions. To affirm that the foreign 
policy outcome (failure of the EDC) was only due to the Assembly’s vote might seem 
like an exaggeration. However, it would also be wrong to ignore it, since de jure and de 
facto, the EDC failed because of it. Whether the fate of the project was already dictated 
by deterministic considerations on the workings of the international system is not only 
superficial, but also difficult to prove given the number of variables involved.  
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Conclusions: 
 
The discourse used across the IR literature usually evokes concepts such as 
“factors”, “variables”, and “systems” (Narizny, 2018). Some theories of International 
Relations use these concepts to study the functioning of the international system or to 
explain state behavior. Often, however, IR theorists do not agree in the least on their 
findings. This thesis takes seriously the assumptions of one of these theories 
(neoclassical realism) and it applies them to a very specific case. Namely, the 1954 
failure of the EDC Treaty. In taking neoclassical realist assumptions seriously, this 
thesis moves the debate away from the highly abstract domain of theory, down to the 
concrete realm of history, politics and law. Thus, it makes the deliberate choice of 
analyzing the most particular and concrete case possible, from which it is possible to 
infer the validity of neorealist claims on why a state should make certain «[f]oreign 
policy choices» (Rose, 1998, p. 147). That is, it studies the official transcripts of the 
National Assembly sessions leading to the vote that decided the demise of the first 
European military integration project. 
The result is that the basic assumptions of Neoclassical Realism hold for the most 
part. However, the greatest problem that this theory entails has to do with its 
incorporation of leaders’ “perceptions”. While being mostly left out by recent 
contributions (either pro or contra neoclassical realism, Narizny, 2017), this constitutes 
one of the pillars of the theory (Rose, 1998). In this regard, to affirm that perceptions 
“matter” when it comes to foreign policy (Rose, 1998) is problematic. By this I mean 
that incorporating perceptions within a theory of international relations, although being 
a very engaging and philosophically correct intuition, makes that theory difficult to 
verify. 
To conclude, perceptions do matter when it comes to influencing the decisions of 
politicians or state leaders. However, they cannot be measured or observed consistently. 
For this reason, neoclassical realism can be a scientifically useful instrument to explain 
foreign policy only for what regards the dynamic existing between external and 
domestic factors. This has been clearly present and operative throughout our analysis. 
For what regards the third, more psychological pillar of their theoretical framework, 
neoclassical realist authors might have beaten off a little more than they can chew.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: The Speakers against the EDC and their arguments12 
Name Session(s) Arguments 
Moch 28, I Constitutional conflicts; 
imbalances/inequality; 
sovereignty concerns; 
military inadequacy; fear 
of German rearmament. 
Gaborit 28, I Fear of German 
rearmament. 
Triboulet 28, I Military inadequacy; fear 
of German rearmament; 
loss of status/colonial 
concerns. 
Lejeune 28, II Fear of German 
rearmament; 
imbalances/inequality. 
Palewski 28, II Constitutional conflicts; 
sovereignty concerns. 
De Moro-Giafferri 28, II Imbalances/inequality; 
fear of German 
rearmament; sovereignty 
concerns. 
Brusset 28, II Constitutional conflicts; 
mistrust of 
supranationalism; economic 
concerns; 
imbalances/inequality. 
Lapie 29, I Fear of German 
rearmament; constitutional 
conflicts; mistrust of 
supranationalism; economic 
concerns; 
imbalances/inequality. 
Apithy 29, I Constitutional conflicts; loss 
of status/colonial concerns; 
mistrust of 
supranationalism. 
Aumeran 29, II Military inadequacy; fear of 
German rearmament. 
Lebon 29, III Fear of German 
rearmament. 
Herriot 30, I Sovereignty concerns; 
imbalances/inequality; fear 
of German rearmament; 
military inadequacy. 
  
                                                             
12 The speakers where for the vast majority against the EDC. Only those who have spoken for a considerable 
amount of time are included. 
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Table 2: Main arguments against the EDC13 
Arguments (occurrences) Proponents 
Fear of German rearmament (9) Moch, Gaborit, Triboulet, Lejeune, de 
Moro-Giafferri, Lapie, Aumeran, Lebon, 
Herriot. 
Imbalances/inequality (6) Moch, Lejeune, de Moro-Giafferri, 
Brusset, Lapie, Herriot 
Constitutional conflicts (5) Moch, Palewski, Brusset, Lapie, Apithy 
Sovereignty concerns (4) Moch, Palewski, de Moro-Giafferri, 
Herriot 
Military inadequacy (4) Moch, Triboulet, Aumeran, Herriot 
Mistrust of supranationalism (3) Brusset, Lapie, Apithy 
Loss of status/colonial concerns (2) Triboulet, Apithy 
Economic concerns (2) Brusset, Lapie 
 
                                                             
13 Arguments are grouped in broad categories. Only the categories mentioned consistently (i.e. by at least two 
deputies) are reported. Some of them, such and economic or constitutional concerns, are more nuanced, but 
further subdivision would reduce them to the individual concern of the speaker. Although apparently similar, the 
different categories are distinct from one another. For instance, the proponents of “imbalances/inequality” 
among the Member States advocate them irrespectively of their opinion on supranationalism or fear of lost 
sovereignty. Luckily, each speaker addresses one problem at a time, letting the researcher single out common 
overarching lines of arguments that link different speakers. 
